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Patent Citation Flows in R&D Collaborations: The Role of Steering Committees in 
Managing Misappropriation Concerns in Biotechnology Alliances 
 
ABSTRACT 
This research contributes to alliance governance research by demonstrating how and 
when partners incorporate administrative controls into nonequity collaborations to regulate 
knowledge transfers across partners. These administrative controls can take the form of board-
like joint committees having explicitly delineated authority over certain alliance activities. We 
illuminate governing committees as an important, albeit neglected, instrument for administrative 
control in the governance of nonequity alliances, and we demonstrate that these organizational 
mechanisms facilitate knowledge flows within the scope of an alliance. We also show that 
governing committees also safeguard against misappropriation hazards, particularly when a 
partner possesses the incentive and ability to engage in such behavior. This study extends 
alliance governance research beyond the implications of the equity-nonequity dichotomy to 
consider a wider and richer gamut of governance instruments available to address the challenges 
associated with knowledge transfers in alliances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Firms in high-technology industries require a steady stream of innovations to remain 
competitive, and innovating successfully often requires firms to update their knowledge bases or 
bridge gaps in them (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008). Interfirm 
collaborations offer a key means for firms to access and absorb external knowledge (Hamel, 
1991; Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter, 2000) or to assemble the requisite knowledge to develop new 
products (Shan, Walker and Kogut, 1994; Anand, Oriani and Vassolo, 2010). However, as firms 
seek to integrate and exploit external knowledge, collaborators also face challenges of 
transferring and safeguarding valuable and proprietary know-how (Giarratana and Mariani, 
2014). Prior research has therefore suggested the need to embed such exchanges in suitable 
organizational forms (Pisano, 1989; Teece, 1996). Considering the two discrete structural 
alternatives of equity and non-equity alliances, studies have found that equity arrangements tend 
to better regulate the knowledge outflows and inflows in alliances (Mowery, Oxley and 
Silverman, 1996; Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn and Jaffe, 2006; Tallman & Phene, 2007). 
Given that an increasing amount of collaborative R&D now occurs through contractual, 
or ‘non-equity’ alliances (Frankort and Hagedoorn, 2017), a question then arises as to how such 
challenges are addressed in inter-firm collaborations. In recent research on non-equity alliances, 
contractual safeguards have been seen as the principal formal governance mechanism at firms’ 
disposal (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Anderson and Dekker, 2005), while much less focus has 
been given to firms’ monitoring and control needs that arise when implementing the alliance 
(e.g., Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). The incompleteness of contracts (Williamson, 1985) 
implies that contracts can only provide a set of safeguards to contingencies foreseen at the start 
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of the trading relationship, so there are bound to be limits on the ability of contractual safeguards 
to serve the needs of non-equity alliances for coordination and adaptation purposes. Recent 
research has therefore begun to consider the potential availability or replicability of coordination 
and control mechanisms similar to those offered by equity forms in contractual alliances (Oxley 
and Wada, 2009), yet little understanding currently exists about the alternative governance 
mechanisms that allow partners to manage problems of knowledge sharing and control during 
the execution of non-equity collaborations. Evidence on partners’ usage of contractually-
stipulated committees (Robinson and Stuart, 2007), which in some ways resemble boards in 
equity joint ventures, may provide an important starting point to investigate governance 
mechanisms in non-equity alliances and examine their implications for the sharing and 
safeguarding of knowledge in these partnerships.  
In this paper, we build upon and extend this emerging stream of research to focus on non-
equity alliances’ steering committees and examine their effects in facilitating knowledge 
transfers and mitigating knowledge misappropriation. Specifically, we ask two questions: First, 
to what extent do steering committees influence knowledge transfers between partners in an 
alliance? Second, under what conditions do these committees adjust knowledge transfers 
between partners? Partners delegate authority to these committees in a bounded manner, and they 
are set up to monitor the progress and performance of an alliance and regulate alliance activities. 
Such committees are authorized to form and dismiss subcommittees or project teams, to alter the 
conduct of activities within the scope of the alliance, and to address conflicts between the 
participants (Smith, 2005). They therefore represent important formal governance mechanisms in 
non-equity alliances as they allow for joint control and serve an alliance’s coordination and 
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oversight needs. 
We test our ideas in the context of alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry and use 
data culled from contracts on non-equity alliances’ administrative committees. The industry’s 
knowledge intensity, the long and uncertain product development process, and the upstream and 
downstream interactions with traditional pharmaceutical companies have motivated many studies 
to investigate inter-organizational collaborations and their implications in this sector (DeCarolis 
and Deeds, 1999; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Partners bring proprietary know-how about 
both technologies and product market applications, thus raising the need to safeguard such 
knowledge. We focus on the monitoring and control features of administrative structures that can 
help facilitate and regulate knowledge exchange processes (Heiman and Nickerson, 2004) and 
can explain how the administrative controls provided by steering committees become 
particularly important when a partner has a greater ability to appropriate knowledge and a 
stronger incentive to gain access to proprietary know-how in a collaboration (Sampson, 2004a).  
In this paper, we contribute to the alliance literature in two ways. First, we look beyond 
contractual safeguards to consider committee structures as another formal governance 
mechanism supporting alliances, one that can have an important bearing on knowledge sharing 
and safeguarding in partnerships. In so doing, we depart from the prior alliance literature that 
imputes administrative controls to equity forms alone and thus potentially underestimates the 
ability of non-equity forms to regulate knowledge transfers between partners. As a corollary, 
because the administrative controls we examine do not conjointly occur with incentive alignment 
from shared ownership, as is the case in equity alliances, we are able to isolate the effects of 
administrative controls on knowledge sharing and safeguarding in interfirm collaboration. Our 
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study suggests that such localized decision-making and control structures instituted specifically 
for the purpose of the alliance facilitate the coordinated adjustment required for knowledge 
transfers. Second, our study also unpacks the threats presented by partners’ abilities and 
incentives to appropriate knowledge and shows how they affect knowledge transfers in non-
equity alliances. Our findings imply that administrative mechanisms are particularly useful under 
these conditions. Our study therefore complements prior research on the knowledge transfer 
implications of different forms of alliances (Mowery et al., 1996) by shedding light on the 
specific conditions under which administrative controls such as steering committees can play an 
important role in regulating knowledge transfers. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Cooperation in R&D activities raises the hazard of spillover of knowledge to partners 
who can exploit the spillovers for private gains (Oxley, 1997). Partners confront the challenge of 
balancing the need to facilitate requisite knowledge exchange in agreed upon areas and limit 
externalities that arise when cooperating in one line of technological activity that leads to 
uncovering knowledge in other areas. For meeting this challenge, partners can embed the 
collaborative activities in a suitable governance structure. Williamson (1991) provides a general 
framework to understand alternative governance structures by identifying incentives and 
administrative control as two of the principal dimensions of a governance mechanism. Building 
on these ideas, research has distinguished equity hybrids from others for the incentive alignment 
coming from joint ownership and the administrative control coming from a joint board of 
directors. This research supposes that such joint control mechanisms are unavailable in alliances 
governed by bilateral contracts (e.g., Oxley 1997; Sampson, 2007).  
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Nevertheless, partners in non-equity R&D alliances can employ several governance 
instruments to support their collaboration. Partners not only allocate specific decision rights, or 
include reporting and auditing requirements in contracts (Lerner and Merges, 1998; Reuer and 
Ariño, 2007), but also can devise an administrative apparatus that extends beyond procedural 
control (e.g., Mayer and Argyres, 2004) to expand the adaptive limits of bilateral contracts. 
Partners can delegate specific authority over monitoring and coordinating the activities of the 
collaboration to joint administrative structures that are often presumed to be available only to 
equity alliances. Partners can establish jointly-staffed steering committee that control the 
activities of the alliance and contractually stipulate the design, functions and performance of 
these board-like structures (Smith, 2005; Reuer and Devarakonda, 2016). Such committees set 
up to govern the alliance can be distinguished from ad hoc task forces or project teams (e.g., 
Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009) based on the contractually defined and enforced scope of 
decisions and authority. The following excerpt from a contract between Roche and Gilead 
Sciences signed in 1996 provides an illustration: 
“The Steering Committee shall also monitor the allocation of research and development 
work between the parties and shall recommend changes as necessary. The parties shall 
report to the Steering Committee on all significant clinical and regulatory issues relating 
to Products, and the Steering Committee shall make recommendations and provide 
strategic guidance with respect to such issues. The Steering Committee shall meet to 
review and approve a global clinical trial program prior to the conduct of any clinical 
trials, and shall review and approve the plans for any individual clinical trial of Product in 
advance of the anticipated commencement date thereof.” 
 
These structures can help not only in reducing contracting costs by reducing the need to account 
for possible contingencies, but also promote efficiency ex post by facilitating monitoring and 
mutual adjustment required for execution of the R&D activities.    
We seek to examine the effects of these steering committees on the scope of knowledge 
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transfers occurring between partners in R&D collaborations. Because partners agree to make 
particular knowledge sets available for meeting alliance objectives, we focus on how partners 
develop on knowledge relevant to the alliance. The degree to which partners build on each 
other’s knowledge derives from both firm- and dyad-specific characteristics (Mowery et al., 
1996; Almeida, Song and Grant, 2002; Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006). Specifically, partners’ 
ability to absorb and their respective incentives to learn from the other partner can influence the 
extent of knowledge transfers occurring between them (Sampson, 2004a). Such firm- and dyad-
level factors matter because partners remain vigilant to the deep exposure of their knowledge, 
and the attendant impairment of rent generating abilities in product and intermediate markets. 
Thus, we wish to consider how steering committees can regulate the build-up of knowledge 
when enacting the alliance, and intervene to mitigate misappropriation concerns. In the following 
hypotheses, we first build upon research on alliances and interorganizational learning to suggest 
that the partner’s ability and incentives derived from the value of the focal firm’s knowledge will 
have an impact on knowledge transfers in alliances. After presenting these baseline predictions, 
we develop the argument that steering committees are able to regulate knowledge spillovers 
owing to a partner’s ability and incentive to engage in opportunistic expropriation of knowledge. 
Technology Overlap 
One of the main factors driving appropriation concerns in an alliance is the ability of a 
partner to assimilate any unprotected or proprietary know-how during alliance implementation. 
For instance, the focal firm may unwittingly divulge proprietary screening techniques or know-
how about manufacturing process specifications. The partner can potentially capitalize on such 
knowledge by employing it for alternative applications or for refining a different set of 
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processes. Following Cohen and Levinthal (1990), research on interorganizational learning 
argues that firms with the requisite absorptive capacity can benefit from assimilating and 
productively using the knowledge inflows from external sources (e.g., Zahra and George, 2002).  
Prior background knowledge may therefore increase the extent to which a partner can 
build on focal firm’s knowledge by lowering the barriers to assimilate any inflows. The relative 
knowledge characteristics of the source and the recipient in part determine the efficacy of 
absorption (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Accordingly, the ability of a partner to absorb potential 
spillovers partly depends on the similarity of the knowledge bases of the partners. Greater 
similarity between the focal firm and the partner's knowledge bases indicates that the partner 
possesses prior experience working in technology areas closely related to those of the focal firm 
(Zander and Kogut, 1995), and familiarity with the structure, content, and utility of the focal 
firm's knowledge and the potential inflows (Szulanski, 1996). This in turn reduces the ambiguity 
associated with the knowledge, enabling the partner to better absorb and utilize the focal firm's 
knowledge (Simonin, 1999). We first offer the following hypothesis on partners’ ability to 
appropriate knowledge as a baseline prediction: 
Hypothesis 1: The degree to which partners build upon each other’s knowledge is 
positively associated with the technology overlap between the partners.  
 
Value of a Firm's Knowledge 
 
While the foregoing discussion emphasizes the ability of a partner to absorb and build on 
the knowledge of its counterpart, partners will also differ in their incentives to actively 
internalize a partner’s knowledge (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989; Kale et al., 2000). Alliances 
allow exposure to a partner’s proprietary skills, routines, and know-how and create new 
technological opportunities by combining these spillovers with existing knowledge. The 
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opportunities that open up, and hence the incentives to actively internalize a partner’s 
knowledge, are not uniform, but vary significantly across partners and collaborative agreements. 
As the intrinsic value of a firm’s knowledge increases, the opportunities created for a partner 
upon absorbing any spillovers, and thus the private benefits of collaboration, become more 
valuable for the partner (Khanna, Gulati and Nohria, 1998). 
The incentive to appropriate valuable knowledge from the firm also gets impacted by the 
cost of actions for assimilating the knowledge, which come in several forms. To begin with, 
firms need to allocate resources to the collaboration and other projects. As one example, firms 
may have to hire or deploy human resources with the necessary skills (Gersbach and Schmutzler, 
2004). Firms may have to redeploy productive employees from other projects to the focal 
alliance, thus creating a cost of foregone opportunity by way of loss in productivity in the 
original projects. Alternatively, firms may have to incur search and deployment costs of hiring 
employees from the labor market. Firms may also have to offer incentives to employees in order 
to facilitate the adoption of incoming spillovers (Dearden, Ickes and Samuelson, 1990). In 
addition, the firm may also alter its monitoring of agents tasked with learning about and adapting 
the incoming spillovers. Inasmuch as it is costly to adjust the organization of these activities 
within a firm (e.g., Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006), then it is more likely that a partner will seek 
to internalize and build upon the firm’s knowledge as the value of the firm’s knowledge 
increases. Before elaborating on whether steering committees can mitigate knowledge 
appropriation, we offer the following hypothesis on partners’ incentives to appropriate 
knowledge as a baseline prediction: 
Hypothesis 2: The degree to which partners build upon each other’s knowledge is 
positively associated with the value of the partners’ knowledge.  
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Steering Committees 
In a basic model of knowledge transfer between partners, the previous two hypotheses 
suggest determinants of the extent of knowledge flows based on characteristics of the originator 
and the beneficiary of the knowledge. In this sense, these two factors support and encourage 
inter-partner learning independent of the managerial structure that is embedded in the alliance 
agreement. We now consider the organizing mechanisms of the alliance that shape the mutual 
build-up of knowledge by enabling partners to address challenges posed by the inherent 
knowledge characteristics and the nature of tasks involved in knowledge production.   
The relevant knowledge that is required to meet alliance goals exists in both explicit and 
tacit form. Partners can learn about ideas, techniques and processes that compose each other's 
knowledge base by examining the corresponding patent documents and scientific publications 
(Mansfield, 1985; Merges, 1988). However, knowledge already codified in these forms can only 
partially provide the input required for productively pursuing the new ideas on which partners 
intend to collaborate (Ouellette, 2012). When innovation proceeds as a trial and error process, 
the knowledge base is experience based and exists in tacit form (Arora, 1995). Thus, partners 
also generally need to obtain necessary inputs from partners, and this knowledge is often sticky 
and presents difficulties in transfer (Szulanski, 1996). During the process of knowledge sharing, 
partners may also have to engage in joint problem solving, which requires effective management 
of the interactions between personnel, and directing the associated search processes (Nickerson 
and Zenger, 2004). Committees governing the alliance can serve as useful interfaces that enable 
partners to overcome the challenges involved in coordinating their activities. 
 Contractually designed steering committees come with several attractive features that 
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allow them to effectively guide knowledge exchange in these ways in alliances. These jointly 
staffed committees can use their authority over activities that fall within the scope of the alliance 
to establish and formalize communication channels that structure the interaction between 
partners for alliance-related activities. They can further enhance the efficiency of communication 
by adopting codes that are mutually agreed upon and are adopted by the partners. They are 
empowered to determine the division of tasks among project teams, regularly review their 
progress, and adjudicate on any disputes that arise in such teams. Committee also serves as the 
bilateral reference forum to turn to in the event of any unforeseen contingency when conducting 
R&D tasks through successive stages. In sum, the joint committee that partners engineer during 
contracting serves to centralize the oversight and management of alliance activities. Therefore, 
we propose the following hypothesis on the steering committee’s ability to effectively guide 
knowledge exchange in alliances:  
Hypothesis 3: The extent to which partners build upon each other's knowledge is 
positively associated with the presence of a steering committee.    
 
Moderating Effects of Steering Committees 
While the foregoing discussion conveys the usefulness of steering committees in 
addressing challenges associated with knowledge transfer in general, steering committees can 
also specifically reduce the hazards associated with knowledge misappropriation that can follow 
from an individual partner’s likelihood of engaging in such opportunism. More specifically, in 
our first two baseline hypotheses, we identified two main antecedent conditions that can 
potentially increase the threat of knowledge appropriation, so we expect that steering committees 
will address these two root sources of ex post exchange hazards in R&D collaborations.  
Firms can employ several protection mechanisms to safeguard their intellectual property. 
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In general, firms can rely on patents, copyrights and trade secrets to protect critical information 
(Cohen et al., 2000). However, these mechanisms are limited in their ability to safeguard 
valuable knowledge resources because not all knowledge residing within a firm is eligible for 
such legal protection. Specific to an individual alliance, firms can also stipulate contractual 
safeguards to delineate what knowledge is shared between the partners, and what rights partners 
have over the shared knowledge, and how such shared knowledge may be applied in the future. 
Thus, the general intellectual property rights mechanisms combined with the alliance-specific 
contractual safeguards provide a legal basis for the firms to collaborate in an alliance. However, 
contractual safeguards are also limited in protecting against risks that befall the firm during the 
implementation of the alliance, and know-how or valuable ideas that are not legally protected are 
particularly at risk. In this respect, administrative structures that oversee the knowledge 
contributed by partners become an important part of the governance design of R&D alliances. 
Valuable knowledge can be appropriated within an R&D alliance by several means. 
Alliances can open private channels of interaction such as email and IT tools that may provide 
contact to the critical resources within the firm (Appleyard, 1996). This private access combined 
with increased transparency of knowledge obtained through the alliance creates points of contact 
between the partnering firms where critical know-how can be exposed (Heiman and Nickerson, 
2004; Giarratana and Mariani, 2014).  When left without adequate controls, a decentralized way 
of functioning in non-equity alliances can result in unwarranted access to the organizational 
contexts within which exchange of tacit knowledge takes place within organizations (Sampson, 
2006; Heiman & Nickerson, 2002). Scientists and researchers may be less cognizant of 
misappropriation concerns and may discuss and reveal valuable incipient ideas gained through 
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experience. Documents such as test data or blue prints are also at the risk of being inadvertently 
shared with the partner. In particular, in the biotechnology sector test data about molecules and 
how the molecules function are critical, so loss of such non-patentable data and information to a 
partner may severely hamper the firm's ability to extract future rents (Pisano, 2006). As we have 
discussed in developing our baseline hypotheses (H1 and H2), the potential loss of knowledge 
through these various means can increase significantly when the firm possesses valuable know-
how or when the partner has the requisite abilities and complementary capabilities and know-
how to take advantage of the spillovers. 
Administrative structures in the form of steering committees can help partners mitigate 
these concerns in several ways. Steering committees with oversight responsibilities for the 
alliance can serve as a screen for the knowledge processes between partners. The joint decision-
making processes driven by consensus can also safeguard the interests of each of the partners. 
These characteristics of steering committees not only can reduce the risk of appropriation in the 
first place but enable the partners to selectively intervene in the alliance as and when a threat is 
detected. Steering committees thus serve as potent monitoring instruments to tackle the threat of 
leakage of intellectual property and preserve the value of their knowledge assets. 
Steering committees can therefore mitigate knowledge transfers tied to a partner’s ability 
and incentives to appropriate knowledge discussed earlier, for several reasons. First, this 
structure overlays a formal administrative layer on top of the technical or operational 
management of an alliance. The steering committee by itself or through appointed 
subcommittees can structure the interactions of researchers and reduce the need for direct 
interactions between many scientists and technical personnel. Second, by using its delegated 
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authority, the committee can formulate rules of engagement and interaction between the partners' 
employees (Liebeskind, 1997). In this way, the partners can regulate access to critical human 
resources. The steering committee can also suitably manage the extent of socialization and face-
to-face contact between individuals in order to limit the transparency of knowledge (Heiman and 
Nickerson, 2004). Finally, the steering committee can not only institute rules governing partners’ 
interactions but also monitor their implementation. 
In a similar fashion, the steering committee can also facilitate monitoring of resource 
allocation decisions of the partners. For instance, when the focal firm has valuable knowledge, 
this can induce the partner to devote greater resources to value appropriation, as described above 
(Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012). By detecting opportunistic deployment of resources or 
unauthorized leakage, the firm can appropriately respond either through legal means or through 
termination if adjustments to the collaboration orchestrated by the steering committee are not 
adequate. We therefore posit that steering committees can mitigate appropriation problems that 
arise when a partner has a greater ability or incentive to appropriate a firm’s knowledge:  
Hypothesis 4: The presence of a steering committee reduces the positive effect of 
technology overlap on the extent to which the counterpart builds on a partner’s 
knowledge.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The presence of steering committee reduces the positive effect of the value 
of partner’s knowledge on the extent to which the counterpart builds on a partner’s 
knowledge.  
 
METHODS 
Data for our empirical analyses come from several sources. We use pooled cross 
sectional data from alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry. This sector serves our purposes 
well because pharmaceutical firms increasingly rely on collaborations for innovation 
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(Hagedoorn, 2002). Our analysis suggests that recent investments in collaborative R&D 
arrangements have been in range of USD 15 to 40 billion per annum. Anecdotal evidence from 
our conversations with managers involved at major pharmaceutical companies such as Eli Lilly 
and Johnson and Johnson have revealed that each collaboration is idiosyncratic and managers 
design them with great care. From this perspective, a key benefit of studying collaborations in 
this sector is to reveal systematic regularities that accord with theoretical principles that would 
inform the design of collaborations in other high tech sectors as well. Moreover, the sector 
prominently utilizes patents as the chief appropriation mechanism (Arora, Ceccagnoli and 
Cohen, 2008), allowing the use of patent data to assess various knowledge characteristics of the 
partners. We combine information from alliance contracts available from Thomson Reuters’ 
Recap database (e.g., Schilling, 2009), and we augment these data with information from the 
alliances module of Thomson Financial's Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database in order to 
track prior alliances. We also match these data with patent data from PATSTAT, the worldwide 
patent database compiled by the European Patent Office (EPO).  
We consider non-equity R&D alliances formed in the period 1987-2006 between a 
pharmaceutical and a biotechnology firm or between two biotechnology firms. Because we 
analyze knowledge transfers, we focus on alliances that aim to conduct R&D in order develop 
products for therapeutic applications and involve a non-trivial knowledge component, and we 
exclude other types of interfirm agreements. Further, we concentrate on alliances which involve 
knowledge exchange and for which we can extract information about contractually defined 
administrative controls. We rely on Recap's catalogue of the alliances to identify agreements 
classified as Research, Development, Co-Development, and Collaboration, and for which Recap 
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provides a contract and its analysis. To enable construction of patent-based measures, we also 
focus on alliances wherein both partners have applied for a patent with a patent issuing 
organization (e.g., USPTO, EPO etc.). After accounting for outliers, these steps yielded a final 
sample of 350 non-equity alliances.  
Measures 
Dependent Variables. A substantial body of research in economics and business has 
used patent citations as indicators of knowledge flows (e.g., Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 
1993; Almeida, 1996). Evidence from surveys supports the notion that patent citations trace the 
paths of knowledge acquisition by firms (Duguet and MacGarvie, 2005).  We follow this 
literature and use patent citations to gauge knowledge transfers between partners (e.g., 
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). We are mainly interested in the extent to which partners build 
on each other's knowledge post-formation, and measure this as the number of times partners cite 
each other ex post while excluding citations that originated during patent examination.  
We are specifically interested in measuring knowledge transfers related to the scope of 
the alliance. The challenge here is to link the knowledge domain of the alliance to a related set of 
patent classes. For developing this concordance, we use Recap's assignment of each alliance to 
specific technology areas drawn from a catalogue containing over 50 types of technologies (e.g., 
recombinant DNA, monoclonal antibodies, immunoglobulins, etc.). We match these areas to 
specific technology groups under the Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) scheme (CPC, 
2016). Based on CPC-defined technology groups (the nested levels are: section, class, subclass, 
group, and so on.), we identify patents and citations that belong to technologies related to the 
alliance, and determine knowledge flows that fall within and outside the scope of the alliance.  
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Our primary dependent variable therefore counts the number of times within a given time 
window after alliance formation a partner cites any of its counterpart's patents that belong to the 
technology domain of the alliance. Because partners are more likely to cite each other in the five 
year window after formation (Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006), we follow previous research and 
employ a 5 year window and use a 7 year window as a robustness check. We distinguish partners 
as the R&D Firm and Client Firm based on which partner primarily contributes technology to the 
alliance, as indicated by Recap. Separately considering the knowledge build-up by each of the 
partners allows us to incorporate this asymmetry in knowledge contribution to the alliance. Thus, 
our measures account for both the direction and the extent of knowledge transfer between the 
partners (Oxley and Wada, 2009). Citations by client firm, counts the number of times the client 
firm’s patents cite the R&D firm’s patents. Similarly, Citations by R&D firm, counts the number 
of times the R&D firm’s patents cite the client firm’s patents. 
Independent Variables. Our first explanatory variable is a measure of the firms’ 
technology overlap and quantifies how close the partners are in technology space. We use the 
method Jaffe (1986) proposed to calculate this measure, relying upon the distribution across CPC 
technology groups of all patents applied for prior to the alliance formation to derive a patent 
vector for each partner. We then calculate Technology overlap between the partners as the 
uncentered correlation coefficient, which is bounded by 0 and 1 and takes greater values when 
the technology profiles of the partners become more congruent (Oxley and Sampson, 2004). 
Our second explanatory variable is a partner-specific measure of the value of 
technological resources, which we build for the partner’s patent portfolio. Prior research has 
shown that forward citations received by a patent serve as a key indicator for their value (Hall, 
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Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005). In order to capture the value of patents in technological areas that 
are focal to the alliance, we followed the approach we employed for capturing patent cross 
citations. Taking into account all issued patents applied for in a 10-year window prior to the 
alliance, we counted the number of forward citations received in the 5-year window after the 
grant (Mehta, Rysman and Simcoe, 2010) and apply a logarithmic transformation. We construct 
two sets of variables for knowledge within and outside the scope of the alliance, which we label 
R&D firm knowledge value (in scope), Client firm knowledge value (in scope), respectively, for 
the  value of the R&D and client firms’ knowledge within the scope of the alliance, and R&D 
firm knowledge value (ex scope), Client firm knowledge value (ex scope), respectively, for the 
value of their knowledge outside the scope of the alliance. 
Our third explanatory variable is the Steering committee indicator. We refer to the 
alliance contract to identify whether the alliance partners establish a joint steering committee 
with oversight responsibilities of alliance activities. Thus, Steering committee is a binary variable 
which equals one when such steering committee exists and zero otherwise.  Because the decision 
to establish a steering committee is unlikely to be random, we first estimate the probability of the 
partners establishing a steering committee to oversee the alliance. For this purpose, we draw on 
recent research that suggests that moral hazard, misappropriation, and coordination challenges 
drive the choice of the governance structures that support alliance activities (Pisano, 1989; 
Oxley, 1997; Gulati and Singh, 1998). Accordingly, steering committees may be set up to 
monitor potential misappropriation arising from high overlap in partners' knowledge bases 
(Oxley and Sampson, 2004), to monitor moral hazard concerns arising from the size and 
complexity of the alliance (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008), and to coordinate interdependent 
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activities between the partners (Gulati and Singh, 1998). We use Technology overlap as 
described above to proxy for the overlap in knowledge bases of the partners. We use the 
potential monetary value of the alliance between partners as Deal size to proxy for the 
transaction’s complexity, using data from Recap. Based on this dataset’s description of the 
division of alliance-related labor between the partners, we code collaborations according to their 
Reciprocal interdependence, where deals categorized as “Collaboration” or “Co-Development” 
are considered reciprocal (Gulati and Singh, 1998). In addition to these key determinants, we 
also include several alliance and partner level variables which we describe in the following 
section. In the Analyses subsection below, we describe how we use the estimated propensity of 
firms to use steering committees in our models of knowledge flows between partners. 
Control Variables. We control for several features of the partners that may potentially 
explain the observed level of partners’ cross-citations following alliance formation and also 
might be related to the independent variables described above. To begin with, cross-citations 
may follow naturally from an ongoing technical relation between the firms' knowledge bases. To 
control for this, we count the number of times partners cite their counterpart's patents prior to the 
alliance and take a logarithm of this value to compute Pre-Alliance citations by R&D firm and 
Pre-Alliance citations by client firm (Oxley and Wada, 2009). We also include the Herfindahl 
index of the concentration of partners' patent portfolios in the primary patent classes (Oxley and 
Wada, 2009) to control for specialization of knowledge, which we label Concentration of R&D 
firm knowledge and Concentration of client firm knowledge. The post alliance citation level may 
also ensue from the learning acquired from previous alliances with other organizations (Anand 
and Khanna, 2000). We count the number of alliances the partners formed before the focal 
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alliance (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005) and use a logarithmic transformation to calculate the 
Alliance experience of R&D firm and Alliance experience of client firm. 
We also control for several features of the alliance that may affect the observed level of 
partners’ cross-citations. We control for the effect of the size of the collaboration by including 
Deal size, defined as the maximum possible payments through the life of the partnership 
agreement (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). Partners may also employ complex contracts to 
safeguard their knowledge assets. Therefore, we include Contract complexity as the logarithm of 
the byte size of the standard contract analysis provided by Recap (Robinson and Stuart, 2007). 
We also control for incentive alignment between partners achieved through contingent payment 
structures incorporated in the contract. We measure Incentives as an indicator variable for the 
inclusion of contingent payments in the alliance. In addition, prior relationships between partners 
may either initiate follow-on knowledge exchanges or serve as relational governance 
mechanisms to mitigate appropriation. We therefore include the Prior ties (Gulati et al., 2009) as 
the number prior alliances between the partners that precede the focal alliance. We also control 
for whether the alliance is between partners from different countries (International alliance), 
using a dummy variable that equals one if the partners’ headquarters are located in different 
nations (Gulati, 1995), and zero otherwise. 
We also control for several features of the alliance to control for unobserved factors that 
may influence knowledge transfers. We include the dummy variable Biotech-Biotech Deal that 
equals 1 if both the partners are classified as biotech firms, and 0 for alliances between biotech 
and pharmaceutical firms (Lerner et al., 2003). Finally, we incorporate Phase fixed effects to 
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control for the stage of the alliance in the drug development cycle and Period fixed effects to 
control for changes in citation patterns over time (Hall et al., 2001). 
Analyses 
Our analysis aims to estimate the effect of steering committees on the intensity of 
partners’ cross-citations after an alliance is formed. In pursuing such an objective in a 
nonexperimental setup, the principal concern is the bias associated with the selection of observed 
units into different policy regimes or treatments. In order to address this bias and recover the 
average effect of steering committees, we follow the precedent of several empirical studies in 
economics and employ the propensity score matching technique (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). 
This method assumes that matching treated and untreated units on observed factors also balances 
them on the unobserved factors, thus allowing identification of the treatment effect. To model the 
selection of steering committee, we use a rich set of covariates at both partner and alliance level 
that extant literature has shown to determine governance choice in alliances, as described above. 
The specific method we implement follows Hirano and Imbens (2001) and combines propensity 
scores with regression. In this method, the bias can be removed by first estimating the propensity 
score, and then weighting observations with the inverse of the propensity to receive the observed 
treatment to estimate a weighted regression model (Hirano et al., 2003). We estimate the 
propensity score using a probit model (see Azoulay et al. (2009)). 
We then employ a negative binomial framework for our regression of knowledge 
transfers across partners because of the count nature and over dispersion of citations. The 
dispersion parameter (α) is significant (p<0.001) in all our models, thus confirming over 
dispersion in the data and supporting the selection of a negative binomial framework. We report 
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heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Because several client firms in our final sample enter 
into more than one alliance, we report standard errors clustered on the client firms. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
-------------------------- 
Descriptive statistics and correlations appear in Table 1. Of the 350 alliances in our 
sample, 35 percent utilize a steering committee to oversee the alliance. As might be expected, the 
R&D firm's patent stock tends to be more concentrated (p<0.001), and client firms’ patents tend 
to be more frequently cited (p<0.001). Partners more intensely cite each other post alliance than 
pre-alliance (p<0.001). We examine variance inflation factors (VIF) to diagnose multicollinearity 
concerns and find that the maximum VIF is 2.4, which is well below the critical value of ten.  
In Table 2, we report estimates of a probit model for propensity scores for steering 
committees. These findings confirm that firms tend to put in place steering committees when 
faced with ex post exchange hazards and coordination needs for their collaborative agreements. 
Specifically, estimation results indicate that steering committees are more likely when firms face 
higher levels of technology overlap (p=0.043), and form a larger collaboration (p<0.001). The 
coefficient estimate for reciprocal interdependence is also positive (p<0.001). Using this 
specification, we estimate the probability of establishing a steering committee for each 
observation. We then calculate the weights using the following formula: 
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖 =
𝐼(𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖 = 1)
𝑝?^?(𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 1)
+
𝐼(𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖 = 0)
1 − 𝑝?^?(𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 1)
 
where I is an indicator function for whether partners establish a steering committee or not and p-
hat is the estimated likelihood of a steering committee being present. We also performed 
additional checks to investigate potential concerns arising from the use of weights from 
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propensity scores (results available from the authors). First, when using matching estimators 
such as ours, a potential bias exists when there is no common support between the treated and the 
control samples (Heckman et al., 1997). We therefore constructed density plots of the propensity 
scores, which demonstrate that a comparison group exists for almost all treated group 
observations across the range of propensity scores, thereby alleviating the common support 
concern (Heckman et al., 1996). Second, we repeated our analyses presented below by excluding 
observations with the extreme values of propensity scores where and imbalance between treated 
and control groups is more likely and found consistent results. 
-------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
-------------------------- 
We present two sets of results that separately analyze the knowledge transfers to each of 
the partners to test our hypotheses. Table 3 shows estimates of negative binomial regression 
models where the dependent variable is Citations by client firm. Table 4 shows estimates of 
binomial regression models where the dependent variable is Citations by R&D firm. In these 
tables, we report estimates of the baseline regression in model 1. In model 2, we introduce the 
main effect of steering committee. Models 3 and 4 successively introduce the individual 
interaction effects with technology overlap and the partner’s knowledge value. Finally, model 5 
includes the full set of interactions. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 & Table 4 here 
-------------------------------------- 
In the baseline models, we examine how ability of a partner to appropriate knowledge as 
well as the value of the focal firm's knowledge affect knowledge build-up by the partner in a five 
year window after the formation of the alliance. Hypothesis 1 suggests a positive sign for the 
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coefficient of Technology overlap in both tables. In Table 3, we find that the estimated 
coefficient of Technology overlap is positive (p=0.036), which can be interpreted in 
semielasticity terms as an 45% increase in citations by a client firm from the mean for a one 
standard deviation increase in Technology overlap. Hypothesis 2 suggests a positive sign for the 
coefficient of R&D knowledge value (in scope) in Table 3 and a positive coefficient for Client 
firm knowledge value (in scope) in Table 4. We find that the estimated coefficient of R&D firm 
knowledge value is positive (p<0.001), as is the estimated coefficient of Client firm knowledge 
value in column (1) of Table 4 (p<0.001). A one percent increase in R&D knowledge value 
increases the citations of the R&D firm’s patents by the client firm by 1.96% (p<0.001), and a 
one percent increase in Client firm knowledge value increases the citations of the R&D firm’s 
patents by the client firm by 2.08% (p<0.001) with all other variables held constant. These 
baseline regression results support our argument that greater ability of the partner by way of 
absorptive capacity, and greater incentives owing to the focal firm’s knowledge value, increase 
the intensity of knowledge build-up by the partner.   
Turning to the main effects of steering committees, column (2) in Tables 3 and 4 shows 
the impact of having a steering committee on the citations by the client firm and the R&D firm, 
respectively. Consistent with our third hypothesis, the estimated coefficient of Steering 
committee in column (2) of Table 3 is positive (p=0.032); when partners establish a steering 
committee the intensity with which the client firm cites the patents of the R&D firm increases by 
the client firm on average increases by 95 percent. Similarly, the estimated coefficient of 
Steering committee in column (2) of Table 4 is positive (p=0.084); when partners establish a 
steering committee the intensity with which the R&D firm cites the patents of the client firm 
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increases by 59 percent. These results imply that steering committees support knowledge 
transfers between partners in areas that fall within the scope of the alliance.    
We next investigate the effects of steering committees when partners face appropriation 
threats originating from a partner’s ability and incentive to appropriate knowledge. To the extent 
that the partner’s ability (H4) and incentives (H5) to misappropriate knowledge make it more 
likely for this problem to be manifest in a collaboration, the presence of a steering committee 
overseeing the collaborative activities should mitigate the adverse effects of technology overlap 
and partner knowledge value, respectively. Hypothesis 4 suggested that the effect of Technology 
overlap on citations by the partner firm will diminish for collaborations utilizing steering 
committees. Accordingly, we anticipate a negative sign for the interaction between Steering 
committee and Technology overlap in models shown in column (3) of Tables 3 and 4. As 
expected, we find that the estimated coefficient of this interaction term is negative (p=0.05) in 
column (3) of Table 3. In column (3) of Table 4, although the sign of the interaction term in the 
anticipated direction, it is not significant at conventional levels (p=0.34). These results suggest 
that the steering committees act on the threat of increased knowledge transfers from the R&D 
firm as the overlap increases.  
Finally, we test the interaction between steering committees and partners’ knowledge 
value in column (4). In hypothesis 5, we propose that steering committees can mitigate the 
effects of a partner’s incentive to appropriate when the firm has valuable knowledge. This 
suggests a negative sign for the interaction term between Steering committee and R&D (or 
Client) firm knowledge value in Table 3 and 4. We find that the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction between Steering committee and R&D firm knowledge value in column (4) of Table 4 
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is negative (p<0.001). We also find that the estimated coefficient of the interaction between 
Steering committee and Client knowledge value in column (4) of Table 4 is negative though only 
of marginal significance (p=0.097). These results suggest that steering committees tend to 
regulate knowledge flows in response to the incentive to appropriate. Moreover, our results 
imply that the function of steering committees in safeguarding valuable knowledge applies more 
strongly for R&D firms, which are the primary contributors of technology to an alliance. 
To further clarify the moderating effects of steering committees, we graphically depict 
key interactions in Figures 1, 2 and 3. The expectation function in a negative binomial 
framework is linear on logarithmic scale, which we use in the figures. Figure 1 uses the 
estimation results from column (3) in Table 3 and depicts the impact of steering committees on 
the relationship between overlap in technologies and knowledge transfer from the R&D firm to 
the client firm for an alliance signed in 2000 in the oncology area with no citations prior to the 
alliance, and with all other variables maintained at sample averages. Figure one shows two 
graphs: the graph labeled as Steering committee=1 traces the log of the mean of the cross 
citations when a steering committee is present to oversee the alliance; the graph labeled as 
Steering committee=0 traces the log of the mean of the cross citations when a steering committee 
is not present. The effects accord with the argument that steering committees attend to the risk of 
knowledge leakage arising from greater overlap in partners' knowledge. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 here 
          --------------------------------------- 
 
Moving to the interaction between steering committee and partners’ knowledge value, 
Figures 2 presents interaction plots by depicting the impact of steering committees on the 
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relationship between the knowledge value of the R&D firm and knowledge transfers from the 
R&D firm to the client firm for an alliance signed in 2000 in the oncology area with no citations 
prior to the alliance and with all other variables maintained at the sample averages; Figure 3 does 
the same for the relationship between knowledge value of the client firm and knowledge 
transfers from client firm to the R&D firm. The less pronounced effects of knowledge value on 
knowledge transfer in the presence of steering committees is consistent with the theoretical 
argument that such committees attend to appropriation concerns in alliances. 
Additional analyses 
 We performed a variety of tests to confirm the effects of steering committees on the 
knowledge transfers between partners. Up to now we have considered the cross patent citations 
between partners in the technology areas that are closely related to the alliance. We also 
considered the effects of steering committees on knowledge transfers in areas that are unrelated 
to the technologies that are focal to the alliance. For this purpose we constructed two dependent 
variables that measure the number of times partner cites the patents of their counterpart which do 
not belong to the technology groups that correspond to the alliance. We summarize some of the 
noteworthy results (results available from the authors upon request). To begin with, the 
coefficient of Technology overlap is positive and significant (p<0.001) in specifications for 
citations to the R&D firm’s patents by the client firm. This finding suggests that the absorptive 
capacity of the client firm enables it to learn from the R&D firm in areas outside the scope of the 
alliance. However, a similar effect is not found in the case of the transfers from the client firm to 
the R&D firm. We also find that the coefficient of Steering committee is not significant for 
knowledge transfers outside the scope of the alliance, nor are there significant interactions.  
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Taken together, our findings suggest that the presence of a steering committee in the governance 
structure of the alliance is robustly correlated with regulating knowledge transfers in alliances 
faced with greater misappropriation concerns, especially for the R&D firms, which are the main 
suppliers of technology. We find these results to be consistent with the fact that technology 
contributions to the alliance are not symmetric and client firms play a secondary role in that 
respect. Owing to the greater risk of appropriation that R&D firms may face, they are apt to 
safeguard their knowledge assets more intensely than client firms.     
DISCUSSION 
Contributions and Implications 
Our paper examines the effect of committees governing non-equity alliances on the 
knowledge transfers that occur between partners in R&D alliances. Previous alliance research 
has emphasized greater incentive alignment and hierarchical control for confronting 
appropriation challenges, and this literature mainly associates these two instruments with the 
joint ownership and the administrative apparatus present in equity alliances. This research has 
developed assuming that administrative control mechanisms are generally lacking in contractual 
alliances, thus making difficult the coordinated adjustment and monitoring required for effective 
knowledge transfer (e.g., Sampson, 2007). We suggest that governing committees entail 
delegated authority offer important control mechanisms in contractual alliances, and we also help 
to illuminate their effect on knowledge transfers. Specifically, we elucidate the conditions that 
accentuate the effect of the control exercised through governing committees in alleviating 
knowledge appropriation concerns in R&D alliances.   
Our study sheds light on some key aspects of the design of contractual alliances. By 
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paying attention to steering committees, our study illustrates the ramifications of the structural 
planning dimension of contract design. Specifically, we show the effects of the administrative 
apparatus that partners incorporate in the contract to address the problem of knowledge sharing 
and misappropriation, which can arise as partners undertake joint activities over a longer period 
of time (Palay, 1983; Williamson, 1991). Our study implies that steering committees with 
explicitly delegated authority can guide the partners’ interactions and intervene as necessary to 
appropriately adapt and facilitate knowledge transfer. By analyzing the adaptation effects of 
these committees in promoting knowledge flows within the scope of the alliance, we sharply 
focus on the consequences of the design of administrative control instruments in collaborations 
(Mayer, 2006; Sampson, 2007). Thus, the study not only corroborates some of the conclusions of 
previous studies derived from the study of equity alliances, for which control mechanisms 
conjoin incentives, but the study also uniquely underscores the effect of administrative control 
instruments (Oxley, 1997; Heiman and Nickerson, 2004; Oxley and Wada, 2009).  
Our study also elaborates upon the contingent effects of steering committees on 
knowledge flows. Our analyses indicates that steering committees respond to potential threats of 
excessive exposure of knowledge resulting in erosion of value when partners have the ability and 
incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior. Our results therefore suggest that the protective, 
monitoring role of steering committees intensifies as the threat of self-interested behavior from 
partners in the R&D activities alliance escalates. Our results therefore shed light on the dedicated 
structures through which partners manage alliance activities and monitor partner actions to 
prevent, detect, and respond to unexpected spillovers (Kale et al., 2000). 
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Limitations and Future Research 
Our study also have a number of limitations that extensions might pursue in future 
research. First, our study deals with alliances in the biotechnology sector, in which a strong 
appropriation regime incentivizes firms to actively engage in patenting, and the complementarity 
of R&D resources and capabilities drives collaborative activity. These characteristics features of 
this sector induce the use of sophisticated governance mechanisms. It would therefore be useful 
to study the effects of alliance structuring and contractually delegated authority in other industry 
settings and for different types of collaborations and stages of the value chain to investigate the 
generalizability of our findings.  
By considering the design of committees at the beginning of the alliance, our study does 
not consider the dynamic effects of these committees. In this sense, we are not able to unpack 
whether the steering committee actually addresses incipient misappropriation of knowledge to 
reduce it once it is manifest, or whether the presence of this governance mechanism reduces the 
likelihood that misappropriation emerges in the first place. Future research might also investigate 
the individuals involved in the committee as well as others in the alliance to determine more 
precisely how knowledge flows are controlled and how partners may choose to empower the 
committees with greater authority over alliance activities when leakages are detected, or redesign 
committee structures. Future research might also investigate conditions under which their 
misappropriation might escape the committee’s detection and be addressed by other means.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlation table 
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Table 2: Determinant of steering committees 
Variables (1) 
Technology overlap 0.198* 
 (0.098) 
Reciprocal interdependence 0.743*** 
 (0.174) 
Deal size 0.430*** 
 (0.116) 
R&D knowledge stock 0.234* 
 (0.104) 
Client knowledge stock -0.050 
 (0.094) 
R&D alliance experience 0.089 
 (0.104) 
Client alliance experience -0.087 
 (0.108) 
Contract complexity 0.435*** 
 (0.102) 
Incentives -0.593* 
 (0.299) 
Prior ties 0.095 
 (0.106) 
Biotech-biotech deal -0.037 
 (0.253) 
International deal 0.269 
 (0.166) 
Phase fixed effects (χ2 ) 6.46 
Therapy fixed effects (χ2 ) 23.99*** 
Technology fixed effects (χ2 ) 13.64 
Year fixed effects (χ2 ) 33.80** 
Log likelihood -155.866 
χ2 227.688*** 
N=350. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Determinants of cross-citations by client firms within the scope of the alliance 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Steering comm. X Tech. overlap   -0.653*  -0.026 
   (0.333)  (0.383) 
Steering comm. X R&D know. value (in scope)    -2.820*** -2.805*** 
    (0.705) (0.780) 
Steering comm.  0.952* 1.096* 2.178*** 2.179*** 
  (0.445) (0.453) (0.469) (0.466) 
Tech. overlap 0.450* 0.562* 0.904*** 0.367+ 0.384 
 (0.214) (0.234) (0.242) (0.218) (0.292) 
R&D firm knowledge value (in scope) 1.391*** 1.389*** 1.393*** 3.453*** 3.442*** 
 (0.338) (0.322) (0.315) (0.637) (0.676) 
Client firm knowledge value 2.310*** 2.043*** 2.061*** 2.328*** 2.327*** 
 (0.426) (0.438) (0.460) (0.467) (0.464) 
Knowledge concentration of R&D firm 0.382 0.462+ 0.509* 0.663* 0.664* 
 (0.239) (0.249) (0.243) (0.274) (0.269) 
Knowledge concentration of client firm 0.355 0.025 0.040 -0.285 -0.283 
 (0.272) (0.336) (0.340) (0.362) (0.367) 
Alliance experience of R&D firm -0.163 -0.130 -0.089 0.162 0.163 
 (0.230) (0.248) (0.242) (0.300) (0.299) 
Alliance experience of client firm -0.323 -0.253 -0.277 -0.164 -0.165 
 (0.288) (0.288) (0.287) (0.313) (0.318) 
Pre-alliance citations by client firm 0.658* 0.648* 0.640* 0.697* 0.697* 
 (0.273) (0.291) (0.279) (0.281) (0.282) 
Deal size -1.281*** -1.205*** -1.182*** -1.266*** -1.265*** 
 (0.274) (0.285) (0.283) (0.319) (0.317) 
Contract complexity 1.050*** 0.896*** 0.952*** 0.949*** 0.951*** 
 (0.232) (0.252) (0.257) (0.255) (0.257) 
Incentives 0.443 0.301 0.318 0.241 0.241 
 (0.511) (0.563) (0.574) (0.570) (0.572) 
Prior ties 0.308 0.505* 0.389 0.292 0.289 
 (0.263) (0.255) (0.261) (0.269) (0.292) 
International deal -0.235 -0.082 -0.051 0.313 0.313 
 (0.603) (0.595) (0.591) (0.559) (0.560) 
Biotech-biotech deal -0.997 -0.841 -0.811 0.159 0.155 
 (0.621) (0.617) (0.621) (0.645) (0.659) 
Phase fixed effects (χ2 ) 28.16*** 27.40*** 30.94*** 33.99*** 32.59*** 
Period fixed effects (χ2 ) 7.29* 9.94** 8.78* 9.49** 9.23*** 
Constant -2.150*** -2.617*** -2.880*** -4.438*** -4.440*** 
 (0.634) (0.703) (0.694) (0.706) (0.700) 
Log likelihood -478.889 -475.353 -473.632 -461.789 -461.786 
χ2 115.571 202.442 193.174 206.340 213.172 
α (dispersion parameter) 6.600*** 6.416*** 6.361*** 5.605*** 5.607*** 
N=350. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Determinants of cross-citations by R&D firms within the scope of the alliance 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Steering comm. X Tech. overlap   -0.459  -0.209 
   (0.485)  (0.496) 
Steering comm. X Client know. Value (in scope)    -1.254+ -1.072 
    (0.756) (0.723) 
Steering comm.  0.595+ 0.778+ 1.397* 1.370* 
  (0.344) (0.415) (0.629) (0.628) 
Technology overlap -0.058 0.049 0.366 0.108 0.250 
 (0.305) (0.249) (0.324) (0.227) (0.352) 
Client firm knowledge value (in scope) 2.088*** 1.994*** 1.895*** 2.755*** 2.596*** 
 (0.438) (0.406) (0.379) (0.664) (0.545) 
R&D firm knowledge value 2.296*** 2.235*** 2.245*** 2.220*** 2.220*** 
 (0.559) (0.514) (0.502) (0.491) (0.486) 
Knowledge concentration of R&D firm 0.542* 0.594** 0.604** 0.664* 0.656* 
 (0.222) (0.222) (0.233) (0.264) (0.257) 
Knowledge concentration of client firm -1.440* -1.524* -1.620* -1.297+ -1.365* 
 (0.723) (0.717) (0.742) (0.675) (0.694) 
Alliance experience of R&D firm 0.541 0.635+ 0.633+ 0.619+ 0.618+ 
 (0.341) (0.335) (0.328) (0.349) (0.343) 
Alliance experience of client firm 0.090 0.191 0.157 0.171 0.158 
 (0.233) (0.251) (0.257) (0.247) (0.255) 
Pre alliance citations by R&D firm 0.481 0.443 0.471 0.447 0.457 
 (0.413) (0.383) (0.407) (0.403) (0.414) 
Deal size 0.002 -0.043 0.070 0.071 0.107 
 (0.326) (0.318) (0.304) (0.295) (0.307) 
Contract complexity 0.428* 0.402+ 0.350* 0.284 0.278 
 (0.207) (0.212) (0.178) (0.191) (0.184) 
Incentives -1.063+ -1.018 -1.201 -0.999 -1.083 
 (0.618) (0.631) (0.730) (0.637) (0.719) 
Prior ties -0.866* -0.854* -0.832* -0.847* -0.837* 
 (0.425) (0.401) (0.389) (0.394) (0.391) 
International deal 0.781* 0.780* 0.866* 0.741+ 0.785* 
 (0.377) (0.382) (0.366) (0.392) (0.378) 
Biotech-biotech deal 0.465 0.531 0.497 -0.041 0.029 
 (1.165) (1.060) (0.993) (0.807) (0.822) 
Phase fixed effects 53.16*** 49.60*** 54.11*** 52.30*** 54.40*** 
Period fixed effects (χ2 ) 7.36* 8.16* 7.73* 7.24* 6.82* 
Constant -1.819*** -2.169*** -2.244*** -2.464*** -2.453*** 
 (0.575) (0.612) (0.553) (0.577) (0.566) 
Log likelihood -467.102 -465.794 -464.852 -463.846 -463.696 
χ2 216.180 229.766 246.055 254.905 265.601 
α (dispersion parameter) 5.670*** 5.596*** 5.549*** 5.581*** 5.558*** 
N=350. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Effect of interaction between steering committees and technology overlap on cross 
patent citations by client firm in technology areas within the scope of the alliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Effect of interaction between steering committees and R&D knowledge value on 
cross patent citations by client firm in technology areas within the scope of the alliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of interaction between steering committees and client knowledge value on cross patent 
citations by R&D firm in technology areas within the scope of the alliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
